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Abstract
We collect data on the record of every action in over one thousand
cases involving public companies from 2004 to 2011 in the Delaware
Court of Chancery, which is the leading court for corporate law dis-
putes in the United States. We use these data to estimate how markets
respond to Delaware litigation events and characteristics such as case
initiations, procedural motions, case quality, and judge identity. We find
that negative abnormal returns are associated with the filing of deriva-
tive and contract cases, but we observe little effect associated with the
filing of the average merger challenge. When we include measures of
case quality, we see that higher quality cases increase the expected im-
pact of derivative and contract litigation on firm value. We also develop
evidence that tactics associated with multijurisdictional litigation are
associated with a weakened impact of litigation on firm value. This ev-
idence is consistent with the belief that the presence of litigation in an-
other jurisdiction allows defense lawyers to bid down competing groups
of plaintiffs’ lawyers during settlement negotiations. Finally, we show
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that abnormal returns are not associated with information on judicial
assignment at the time of case filing, nor are they associated with judge
identity at case resolution. These results suggest that the judicial im-
pact on shareholder wealth at the time of judicial assignment and the
time of case termination is too small to be statistically detected.
1 Introduction
The effects of litigation on firm value has long been a central focus for scholars
of law and business. These inquiries have been limited by the difficulty of
collecting large, uniform samples and the lack of detailed information about
the type of cases, motions, announcements, and key milestones that constitute
the lifetime of a case. In this study, we significantly expand the depth of the
information available by collecting electronic docket data from the Delaware
Court of Chancery, which is the leading court for corporate disputes in the
United States.1 The granular nature of the docket data allow us to specify
event windows with precision and it allows us to extract information about
procedural tactics, litigation intensity, and judicial assignment in these cases.
We use this additional information to analyze how these case features affect
firm value.
We develop three primary results about the impact of Delaware corporate
litigation on shareholder wealth. First, we examine how the filing of different
types of complaints affects shareholder wealth. Our evidence shows that mar-
ket participants appear to draw stronger inferences from the filing of corporate
law cases that have high initial barriers to moving forward. For example, we
demonstrate a negative effect on firm value associated with the filing of a
derivative case. These cases, in which shareholders sue directors on behalf
of the firm, require that plaintiffs show at the outset that directors are too
conflicted to investigate the alleged wrongdoing. Overcoming this threshold is
particularly difficult in an era where the majority of directors on public com-
pany boards are independent. Indeed, in the absence of a compelling showing
that a majority independent board was complicit in the alleged wrongdoing,
1More than 50% of all public firms are incorporated in Delaware, while New York, the
state with the second highest share, attracts fewer than 5% of public firms (Daines, 2001).
The judges of the Chancery Court are well-versed in corporate law and their speed and
effectiveness is one of the reasons that has been credited for Delaware’s success in attracting
incorporations (Kahan, 2006).
Delaware courts will typically dismiss the suit. We hypothesize that this high
initial barrier should lead plaintiffs to conduct more pre-suit investigation.
This investigation may uncover information that is not known to the market
as a whole and, as a consequence, the filing of the suit may alert market par-
ticipants that the case may have merit. Derivative cases with merit have the
potential to be costly and disruptive as there have been a number of historically
large damage awards–and related attorney fee awards– in stock option back-
dating and insider trading derivative cases during our sample period (Cheffins
et al., 2012). Our evidence of a negative effect associated with derivative case
filings supports this account. We buttress this claim by showing that the
negative effect increases with our proxies for case quality, which include the
appearance of out-of-state counsel in the matter and the total number of cases
filed.
Acquisition-related cases, which are another important segment of Chancery
Court corporate disputes, tell another story. These disputes are, at this point,
automatic in the wake of a merger or acquisition (Cain and Davidoff, 2012).
Unlike derivative suits, merger cases do not have the high initial threshold
to proceeding. Defendant boards will typically settle these suits rather than
fight them because, even in cases with little merit, it is difficult to obtain a
dismissal prior to the closing of the transaction. As a consequence, the average
case filing of this sort is unlikely to provide new information to the market.
Our data confirm this expectation as we show that the average merger case
filing produces no statistically detectable abnormal return.
Our second primary result develops evidence on the consequences of mul-
tijurisdictional litigation. Scholars debate whether this type of competition
sharpens the effectiveness of corporate litigation or blunts it by creating a race
to settle. Litigating a single matter across multiple jurisdictions can create a
“reverse auction,” (Coffee, 1995) which allows defendant firms to bid compet-
ing groups of plaintiffs down in an effort to obtain a relatively cheap global
settlement. Evidence consistent with this mechanism would suggest other con-
texts, such as the ability to file multiple class action suits, e.g., in Australia
in the context of third-party litigation funding, for the same action can also
result in less deterrence than policymakers might think (Chen, 2015).
We use the presence of a motion to expedite–a tactic that we show corre-
lates with the existence of a case in another jurisdiction–to assess the impact
of this type of litigation. The analysis suggests that multijurisdictional liti-
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gation may dilute the impact of derivative cases and and acquisition-related
cases. This evidence supports the concern that litigating a single matter across
multiple jurisdictions creates a “reverse auction.”
Our final question builds on the econometric investigations of decision
maker assignment. We seek to examine if judges in cases most closely fol-
lowed by markets have direct effects the moment they are assigned rather
than the moment when the decisions are revealed. This kind of analysis is
typically not possible in other settings. (Belloni et al., 2012; Chen and Yeh,
2014; Chen and Lind, 2014; Chen and Sethi, 2011). The structure of the Court
of Chancery–which has a large corporate docket, a small number of judges, and
faces significant scrutiny from the business press, equity analysts, and merger
arbitrageurs–presents an ideal environment for this type of analysis. We find
little evidence that the market accounts for judicial identity either at the time
of filing or at the time of case resolution.
While the focus of the paper is on Delaware, this study offers some insights
potentially capable of greater generalization. Haslem (2005) is the only paper
with a comparable sample size that we are aware of that also examines the
effects of litigation on firm value. In that paper, he collects 737 cases from
across the U.S. and finds that the market views settlement as a negative out-
come on average. He suggests that firms with weak corporate governance settle
litigation more quickly, and the market reacts more negatively to settlements
involving firms with higher agency costs. We find some evidence consistent
with this hypothesis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the literature on corporate
litigation and draws on that literature to develop our hypotheses. Part III
describes the sample used in this study and reports descriptive statistics. Part
IV examines the wealth effects associated with the litigation and analyzes
the potential determinants of those effects. Part V concludes. Appendix A
provides the definitions of the variables used in the regressions and Appendix
B details our investigation of the association between motions to expedite and
multijurisdictional litigation.
2 Background and Hypothesis Development
In this section we discuss our expectations about the effect of case types and
case features on firm value. We develop these hypotheses by drawing on the
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existing literature on corporate litigation. Before doing so, however, we pro-
vide some brief comments on the Delaware Chancery Court’s docket. The
equitable jurisdiction of the Chancery Court means that certain types of cases
filed by and against firms that are incorporated in Delaware have the option of
being litigated in the Chancery Court. Most of the that involve public corpo-
rations fall into one of three categories: (1) derivative lawsuits; (2) shareholder
class actions that challenge an acquisition; and (3) inter-firm contract disputes
(Badawi, 2013). We limit our data to cases that fall into these categories.
2.1 Case Types and Expectations
Among our three categories of lawsuits— derivative cases, merger class actions,
and contract cases—the likelihood of a lawsuit when circumstances might pro-
duce one varies substantially. We discuss our hypotheses for each of type of
these cases below.
2.1.1 Derivative Lawsuits
Studies from 1980s and early 1990s find little relationship between the filing
of derivative lawsuits and firm value. A pioneering paper by Romano (1991)
shows no significant effect on stock price associated with the filing of a deriva-
tive lawsuit in 66 lawsuits.2 Likewise, she finds no significant effect when the
lawsuit gets reported in the Wall Street Journal, which occurs, on average,
two weeks after filing. This null effect may be due to the small monetary
awards that went to shareholders in derivative suits at that time. She finds
that derivative settlements are, on average, only 0.5 percent of firm assets.
A related study by Fischel and Bradley (1985) looks at the effect of court
rulings on motions to dismiss in derivative suits. They find a significant nega-
tive effect associated with dismissals and an insignificant positive effect when
courts decline to dismiss suits, but do not find a significant effect around the
filing date and conclude that any aggregate effect is likely to be negligible.
As Bhagat and Romano (2002) point out, this finding is consistent with the
negligible effects that Romano finds in her 1991 study. The conventional wis-
dom at the time was consistent with these studies: derivative lawsuits were
thought to be largely meritless and involve small recoveries (Armour, Black,
2West (2001) conducts a more recent investigation of derivative lawsuits in Japan. Like
the other studies, he finds no stock market effect associated with the filing of these cases.
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Cheffins, 2012). To put this another way, the ease of showing demand futil-
ity at this time allowed meritless suits to produce a settlement for plaintiffs’
lawyers. Consequently, these cases got filed even when they were meritless.
In the time since these studies, however, there have been sizable shifts in
the makeup of boards and those changes have had an impact on the expected
value of filing a derivative lawsuit. To understand why this is so, it is helpful
to provide some brief background on the demand futility requirement. To
move forward in a derivative lawsuit, the plaintiffs must show either that
they made a demand on the board that it investigate the alleged wrongdoing
or that such a demand would be futile. A board’s refusal to investigate a
demand is subject to the extreme deference of the business judgment rule.
In practice, this approach means that the lawsuit will fail unless there is a
plausible claim that demand is futile (Bainbridge, 2004). To show that futility
the plaintiffs must show that a majority of the directors were implicated in the
alleged wrongdoing or that they cannot otherwise act independently. As the
percentage of independent directors on boards grows, it becomes more difficult
to show that demand would be futile.
There has been a marked increase in the use of independent directors over
the past few decades. Some of the reasons for this shift include regulatory
mandates such as the requirement under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that pub-
lic companies have audit committees comprised of only independent directors
and NYSE and NASDAQ regulations that require that the majority of board
members be independent (Davis Jr, 2008). As Thompson and Thomas (2004)
suggest, the trend towards an increasing number of independent directors on
corporate boards has likely made it made it more difficult to sustain a deriva-
tive lawsuit. As compared to the earlier era, it is substantially easier for the
defendant directors to get a case dismissed quickly on the basis of demand
futility. In order to get past this requirement, plaintiffs will typically need to
make a substantial showing that the independent directors were complicit in
the alleged wrongdoing. This evidence is likely to require investigation of in-
formation that is not available to the broader public. The filing of a derivative
suit may thus signal the existence of a strong case and that information may
be new for market participants. These stronger cases are, all else equal, likely
to result in larger damages and larger attorney fee awards (Armour, Black,
Cheffins, 2012). Moreover, the filing may also signal an undisclosed problem
with existing management or the board’s oversight over management. We
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thus expect the filing of a case to bring new (and negative) information to the
market.
H0A: The filing of derivative lawsuits should, on average, result in a de-
crease in firm value.
2.1.2 Merger Class Actions
Merger class actions are lawsuits filed by an individual or institutional share-
holder on behalf of all shareholders. In the most typical scenario, a plaintiff
alleges that the directors of the target company breached their fiduciary duties
to the shareholders by failing to obtain a sufficiently high price for the target
firm.3 Over the course of our sample, the likelihood of a lawsuit in the wake of
acquisition has increased from probable to a near certainty. Cain and Davidoff
(2012) show that roughly 45% of mergers were the subject of lawsuits in 2005
to over 95% of mergers in 2011. Significant settlements or awards are quite
rare in these cases–a large majority of these cases result in a settlement that
involves additional disclosures about the merger to shareholders and a pay-
ment of relatively small fees to the plaintiffs’ lawyers (Davidoff et al., 2015).
Given the high frequency of these lawsuits and the low likelihood of a highly
adverse result, we thus expect the filing of merger lawsuits to have little effect
on firm value.
H0B: Merger lawsuits are unlikely to have an effect on firm value at the
time of filing.
2.1.3 Contract Lawsuits
Contract lawsuits are probably even more difficult to anticipate than deriva-
tive lawsuits. Derivative claims often piggyback on government investigations.
While that public information may not inform market participants of every-
thing that would go into the decision whether to file a derivative lawsuit, there
is some indication of the factual basis for the claim. That type of informa-
tion about contract disputes is probably less likely to be public as disclosure
requirements typically do not get triggered until after the commencement of
3These lawsuits will often have a higher chance of success if there is some degree of
self-dealing in the transaction, such as a management-led buyout or the involvement of a
controlling shareholder.
7
litigation. And even then, the firm must only disclose material litigation mat-
ters. For this reason, the announcement of a contract case is likely to bring
new information to the market. The degree of the impact should, then, turn
on the amount of expected liability and legal costs. For defendants both the
expected liability and the legal costs should lead to a negative impact on firm
value. For plaintiffs in these lawsuits, the possibility of a positive judgement
and the likelihood of legal costs should have countervailing effects. While a
rational firm would only pursue litigation if the costs outweighed the benefit,
it is possible that the market may make a negative inference about the larger
consequences that stem from the dispute such as the disruption of a long-term
supply relationship that involves a number of firm-specific investments. For
these reasons, we refrain from making a prediction about the effect of filing a
contract lawsuit on firm value. We note, however, that previous research has
not found an effect related to bringing a contract lawsuit (Bhagat et al., 1998).
H0C: Contract lawsuits filed against a firm should result in negative abnor-
mal returns.
2.2 Indications of Lawsuit and Lawyer Quality
The filing of a lawsuit can provide new information that goes beyond the
existence of the action. The complaint can allege information that may not
be widely known or suspected. The identity of the lawyers bringing the case
can signal the strength or weakness of the underlying allegations. And, should
multiple cases get filed at approximately the same time, that fact can send
a signal about the quality of the case. Some of these indicia of quality, such
as the credibility of the allegations made in the complaint, would be very
difficult to standardize and measure. Others, like the effect on stock price of
each additional case that gets filed could, in theory, be captured given a broad
enough window of time. The potential problem with such a metric is one
that is well-known in event study methodology: expanding the length of event
windows to capture the filing of an additional case—or some other indication
of quality—makes it more difficult to attribute the abnormal return to any
specific event.
Rather than expanding event windows, we assume that some measure of
lawsuit and lawyer quality are observable upon filing. We assume that these
observable measures are likely to manifest themselves in events—such as the
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filing of additional lawsuits and the appearance of out-of-state counsel—that
occur after the filing of the case. We expect that higher quality lawsuits will
tend to increase the likelihood of plaintiff success. In the case of mergers,
this prospect may increase share price because there is a higher expectation of
an award to target shareholders (that would likely be paid by the acquirer).
In the derivative and contract contexts, higher quality should lead to larger
chances of liability and, hence, a decrease in share price.
In our analysis, we use two indicators of potential quality. The first of these
indicators is the number of cases filed in response to the same set of facts as a
measure of case quality. We expect this variable to have a positive relationship
with case quality. The more likely there is to be a substantial recovery–which
should be a function of both the underlying facts and the amount at stake–the
more interest a case should draw from plaintiffs’ attorneys. Indeed, Cain and
Davidoff (2013) use the number of cases to control for case quality but they
do not do so in the context of an event study. Note that we do not expect this
variable to be a perfect proxy for the strength of a case. Lawyers could base
the decision to file a case, in part, on media coverage of the underlying facts
and that coverage may have little relationship with case quality. Nevertheless,
we expect that, on average, the decision to file will be driven by expected
recovery and that potential for recovery should have a positive relationship
with the quality of a case.
H1A: The number of complaints filed in response to a similar set of facts
should have a positive relationship with the prospect of liability.
Our second measure is more novel. We code whether the case involves
at least one motion for an out-of-state lawyer to appear. This procedural
device, known as a pro hac vice motion, allows a lawyer who is not admitted
in Delaware to be admitted for the purpose of a single case. The Chancery
grants these motions as a matter of course in nearly all cases (Armour et al.,
2012). We speculate that the presence of an out-of state lawyer is an indication
of the difficulty of the case. While a firm can mount a high-quality defense by
relying on the deep expertise of the Delaware defense bar, a complex case will
typically include the involvement of a firm’s regular counsel and that counsel
is usually from out of state. That regular counsel may be actively involved in
the case or may only be an observer, but our review of the dockets suggests
that an intensely litigated case almost always involves at least one motion to
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admit an out-of-state counsel.4 This observation is borne out in the docket
data. Cases that include at least one motion to admit out-of-state counsel
average about 163 docket entries over the course of litigation. Cases without
such a motion, however, average roughly 30 docket entries.
There is substantial variation in the use of pro hac vice motions. At least
one of these motions gets filed in about three-quarters of merger cases and
two-thirds of derivative cases. We hypothesize that the cases without such a
motion are likely to be of particularly poor quality and we speculate that this
quality is observable at the time of filing. Market participants may be able to
infer this quality from the identity of the lawyers that file the case or from the
underlying allegations. This observation is consistent with existing evidence
that stock prices react to the reputation of the plaintiffs’ lawyers in merger
class actions (Badawi and Webber, 2015).
H1B: The eventual filing of at least one pro hac vice motion should have a
positive relationship with the prospect of liability at the time of filing.
2.3 Indications of Multijurisdictional Litigation
Representative lawsuits, such as acquisition-related class actions and deriva-
tive cases, sometimes involve competing litigation in multiple jurisdictions.5
Litigation in another forum creates the risk that a settlement in the alterna-
tive jurisdiction will have a preclusive effect on all other cases. Corporate law
scholars have suggested that this dynamic can create incentives for a “reverse
auction” among plaintiffs’ attorneys (Coffee, 1995; Griffith and Lahav, 2013).
As these different groups negotiate with the defendant, they may be willing
to make lower offers with respect to damage and attorneys’ fees in order to
ensure that they get something for their effort. All else being equal, the terms
of these settlements should be lower than if the litigation were proceeding in
a single jurisdiction.6
4Because there are many high quality lawyers in Delaware, we choose not to use the total
number of pro hac vice motions in a case as an explanatory variable. A high quality case
where a Delaware firm leads the defense may involve a relatively small number of pro hac
vice motions, while a medium quality case directed by an out-of-state firm may involve a
high number of these motions. As we explain below, we expect cases where no out of state
counsel appear at all, to be of especially low quality.
5For corporate law claims, plaintiffs may usually file a case in the state where firm locates
its headquarters or in the state of incorporation.
6One might object that there is an inconsistency between our prediction that multiple
cases will tend to increase the potential for liability while multijurisdictional cases may
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Complete data on the existence of multijurisdictional litigation is difficult
to collect because parties do not always disclose these lawsuits in their se-
curities filings. As a proxy for the existence of multijurisdictional litigation,
we use the presence of a motion to expedite in the docket. If a court grants
this motion, discovery will begin quickly and the court may issue rulings in
relatively short order. Progression of a case on an expedited basis can make
judges elsewhere reluctant to approve a settlement and may thus diminish in-
centives for a reverse auction. Conversations with Delaware attorneys suggest
that plaintiffs often use motions to expedite for this precise purpose.7 There
is some empirical evidence to support this association. Badawi (2013) shows
that, in the years where there is an increase in multijurisdictional merger lit-
igation, there is also an increase in motions to expedite in Delaware merger
cases. To further confirm this connection, we verify whether there is related
litigation occurring in another jurisdiction for a subset of the cases of our
sample. We present those results in Appendix B, which documents a very
strong positive association between multijurisdictional litigation and motions
to expedite in merger litigation and a relatively strong positive association in
derivative cases.
We observe substantial variation in the use of motions to expedite. In
merger litigation, the cases involve a motion to expedite in about 57% of cases
and in derivative cases, plaintiffs file a motion to expedite in roughly one quar-
ter of the cases. To the degree these motions are indications of lawsuits going
on elsewhere, that competing litigation should be observable to the market.
We thus expect the relationship between the effect on firm value at the time of
filing and the presence of a motion to expedite to be a measure of the effect of
multijurisdictional litigation. Simultaneous disputes in multiple jurisdictions
should tend to dilute the expected effect of the lawsuit. In the case of deriva-
decrease the prospect of liability. If cases in multiple jurisdictions produce a reverse auction,
shouldn’t that also happen when multiple cases get filed in the same jurisdiction? This is
unlikely to occur because, within each jurisdiction, there is a designated group of lead counsel
that has the authority to control the case on behalf of all plaintiffs who have filed a case in
that jurisdiction. The lead plaintiffs’ counsel controls the negotiations with the defendants
and thus the non-lead counsel cannot undercut the lead counsel by making a lower offer to
the defendant.
7To be sure, there are other reasons why a party might a motion to expedite. Perhaps
the leading alternative motivation is that the closing date of a merger is approaching and
expedited proceedings will enhance the credibility of a plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin the
merger. We do not, however, expect the market to be able to predict this dynamic at the
time of lawsuit filing. The presence of litigation elsewhere should, however, be observable.
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tive litigation, this would mean less negative effect on firm value to reflect the
chance of a lower judgement. For merger-related litigation, the effect should
be a less positive effect due to the diminished chance of a significant payment
to the shareholders of the target firm, who are typically the plaintiffs in these
cases and are suing the board of the target firm.8
H2: The presence of a motion to expedite in representative cases should
dilute the expected consequences of a finding of liability.
2.4 Judicial Identity
The docket includes information on the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor assigned
to the case. We use this information to assess the wealth effect of a particular
judge being assigned to a case at the time the judge is revealed and at the time
the case is decided. The theory that motivates this analysis is the possibility
that the market prices expectations about the effect a judge will have on a case.
For example, if a judge has a reputation for being particularly sympathetic to
shareholder plaintiffs in merger suits, all else being equal, one should expect
the stock price to reflect the expectation that the merger price will be adjusted
upward.
Our ability to use this dataset to measure the stock market effect of judicial
assignment appears to be novel. There is, however, a related literature that
attempts to develop empirical measures of judicial quality and prestige. Per-
haps the most prominent of these measures is the degree to which judges get
cited in other jurisdictions. Choi, Gulati, Holman, and Posner (2009; 2011)
have used this metric to rank judges. These authors sometimes use citations
to courts outside the home state, district, or circuit as the relevant measure on
the theory that these citations are a better measure of influence because, by
definition, the courts citing the opinions are not bound by them. These same
authors have also used productivity and judicial independence–measured by
the willingness of a judge to disagree with judges nominated by a President
or governor of the same political party–as alternative metrics to rank judges
(Choi and Gulati, 2005; Choi et al., 2011, 2009).9
8Recall that a successful resolution in a merger-related case is an increase in merger
consideration to the class of shareholder plaintiffs. This payment is typically funded by the
buyer. That prospect should, all else equal, increase abnormal returns. The presence of
multijurisdictional litigation should mute that effect and thus be associated with a decrease
in abnormal returns.
9It is tempting to infer judicial quality from the equity price effects of judicial assignment.
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H3: To the degree there are perceived differences in the manner individual
judges decide cases, those differences should be reflected in firm value upon
assignment of the judge.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
This paper uses a dataset that begins with every docket entry in the Delaware
Court of Chancery for cases categorized as “Civil” from the beginning of 2004
through the end of 2011. The Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction over equitable
cases means that it hears corporate matters, trust and estate cases, questions
relating to purchases of real estate, and contract cases. Any firm incorporated
in Delaware is subject to the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court when a case
falls within these subjects. Given that over 50% of public companies have
incorporated in Delaware, this court frequently settles inter and intra corporate
disputes and has a national reputation for expertise in these matters.
We obtain the data from Westlaw’s electronic coverage of the Chancery
Court’s docket. This coverage began in October, 2003, but because the 2003
entries largely involve cases that were in progress we begin with 2004 cases.
The 2004 to 2011 window includes 7418 unique case numbers that involve a
total of 43441 parties. From this initial dataset, we extract a subset of cases
that involve publicly traded companies. To do so, we use a “fuzzy” matching
algorithm that compares the names of parties from the docket with the names
of publicly available companies extracted from the US Stock database put
together by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The results of
the fuzzy matches are then hand-checked to confirm actual matches.
The resulting subset should be regarded as a large sample of public com-
pany litigation in the Chancery Court over the span of 8 years.10 The resulting
While there are competing definitions of what judicial quality is, in the context of trial-level
corporate cases, we would expect one of the most important measures of ability to be the
minimization of Type I (a finding of liability when the underlying facts support no liability)
and Type II (a finding of no liability when the facts support liability) errors. If a judge is
more prone to these mistakes, the effect on equity price would depend on whether a Type I
or Type II error is likely. We presume that this sort of inference is not possible at the time
of case filing. Moreover, if judges make correct assessments on average and differ only with
respect to the variance of their decisions, a difference in ability should not, on average, affect
equity prices. For these reasons, we expect any judge-specific effects to reflect the different
beliefs they have about how to best characterize the alleged wrongful conduct before them
in an average case.
10There does not, however, appear to be any compelling reason to believe that the match-
ing method would bias the sample in a discernible way. This sort of bias may be possible
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dataset includes a total of 876 publicly traded companies that appear in 1379
cases.11 We distinguish between “lead” cases and “follow-up” cases. Lead cases
are the first-filed actions that relate to a given set of facts. If additional plain-
tiffs file additional cases based on the same set of facts, we designate them as
follow-up cases. We base the coding for lead and follow-up cases on an exam-
ination of the complaint in each case. We also base the categorization of each
case on a reading of the complaint. We retain all cases that can be categorized
as derivative, merger-related, or contract, which is the vast majority of the
cases involving public companies. 12
We search the text of the docket entries to code the presence of certain
procedural events and motions in the docket. The text is standardized so that
frequent procedural occurrences get described is highly similar ways. This
feature of the docket allows us to have a high degree of confidence that our
searches are capturing the correct events. To ascertain whether a pro hac vice
motion has been filed—which typically allows a lawyer from out of the state to
appear in the case—we search for “pro hac vice” and code whether the docket
for a particular case contains that term. For motions to expedite we search
whether the docket has the term “expedite,” “expedited,” and/or “expedition.”
We randomly select cases with both positive and negative hits for both terms
and find no miscodings.
The merger cases, which mostly involve lawsuits against the board members
of the target, benefit from controls for the amount of the premium paid by
the acquirer and the timing of the lawsuit relative to the announcement of
the transaction. From the SDC Platinum database we obtain information
on premium and announcement dates. We use the same “fuzzy” matching
algorithm used to match the docket data to CRSP to match the cases to SDC
data and hand check each match. To be useable, the SDC data must include
the transaction date and the merger premium. Our final matched dataset
includes 279 “lead” merger case filings. We report some statistics based on the
if the cases involving public company subsidiaries, which are sometimes difficult to pick up
through fuzzy matching, tend to differ in important ways from the cases that involve the
parent companies.
11Some cases involve multiple publicly traded companies as defendants and some cases
involve public companies suing each other.
12Some cases involve both derivative and merger-related claims. We allow those categories
to overlap. We do, however, confine the merger-related cases that involve contract claims
to the merger category. Our rationale for doing so is that the contract claims almost always
center on the merger agreement.
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more complete, unmatched merger sample, but many of the regressions based
on merger case filings use the SDC controls.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 provides summary statistics for party status, case type, judicial
assignment, and case and firm characteristics. Figure 1 shows the annual
trends for the case types and party status for those cases categorized as “Lead.”
Several trends are evident. First, the numbers of publicly listed plaintiffs and
the numbers of derivative and contract suits stay relatively steady over the
course of the sample. The variables that fluctuate the most appear to be the
number of publicly listed companies appearing as defendants and the number
of merger-related cases. There has, since 2008, been a large increase in both
those numbers. The increase in merger-related cases may be due both to a
secular increase in the number of those cases as well as a return of these cases
























Annual Trends For Each Case Category
Table 2 summarizes annual trends on the termination of cases for all cases.
We group terminations into four categories: stipulated dismissals, dismissals
13Armour, Black, and Cheffins (2012) have documented the exit of merger cases from
Delaware that occurred from the mid-90s until 2009. There is some evidence, however, that
these cases have returned (Cain and Davidoff, 2011; Badawi, 2013).
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by the court, settlement hearings, and consolidations. When a case ends in a
dismissal or a settlement hearing, we define the date of the dismissal or the
hearing as the termination date. We drop lead cases where the most recent
event is a consolidation. Those cases are still ongoing so it is not appropriate
to treat them as terminated. It is worth noting that the docket data runs until
the middle of 2012. We code for all cases that have terminated by that point,
but drop those that have yet to resolve.
[Insert Table 2 here]
For each year, Table 2 shows the totals for these different categories of
terminations for both lead and follow-up cases. The column for stipulated
dismissals suggests that there is not a tremendous amount of variation for these
types of terminations. For all years other than 2011 the number of stipulated
dismissals is between 44 and 54. In 2011, the number is only 31, but that may
reflect that some cases have not yet terminated. Likewise, settlement hearings
do not vary that much, with a low of 9 in 2008 and a high of 20 in 2009.
There is, however, substantial change in the number of consolidations each
year. These numbers are likely a reflection of the number of follow-up cases
that plaintiffs file; the similarity of cases determines whether consolidation is
appropriate (Badawi, 2013). There are a large number of consolidations in
2005, 2010, and 2011. Relatedly, the average time to termination is relatively
low in those years, which is likely due to the fact that consolidations happen
early on in a case.
As in other courts of equity, there are no juries in the Court of Chancery.
Each case is decided by either the Chancellor, the equivalent of the chief
judge, or one of the Vice-Chancellors [collectively referred to as judges for
convenience]. The Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellors are nominated by the
Governor and are confirmed by the Delaware Senate for twelve-year terms.
The Chancellor has responsibility for assigning the cases to individual Vice-
Chancellors or to himself.14 For most of the period in the sample William B.
Chandler III served as the Chancellor. On June 22, 2011, Vice-Chancellor Leo
Strine was elevated to the position of Chancellor. This means that Chancellor
Chandler served as the Chancellor for the entire sample, except for roughly
the last five months of it.
14Some cases get assigned to Case Masters, which are the equivalent of magistrates. We
keep these cases in the dataset for most of the analysis we perform, but we omit them when
we perform the judge-focused regressions.
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We must be cautious in making inferences because the assignment process
in the Court of Chancery is not randomized. Instead, the Chancellor assigns
cases as they arrive. Chancellor Chandler has suggested that he sought to bal-
ance caseloads in assigning cases Marcus (2011). Fortunately, our data allow
some assessment of the degree to which the assignment process is significantly
non-random. First, to test the distribution of cases, we regress the market
capitalization, plaintiff, pension fund, total cases, motion to expedite, pro hac
vice, and the industry fixed-effects variables against the judge fixed effects
controlling for year and case-type fixed effects. We then run a joint test of the
judge fixed effects. In these unreported regressions, none of 16 joint tests is
significant at even the 10% level. Consequently, we are unable to reject the
null hypothesis (i.e. as a statistical matter, the cases appear to be randomly
assigned across judges).
4 The Wealth Effects of Litigation
This section details the event study methodology that we use and it then
discusses the results of applying that methodology to the Delaware data.
4.1 Estimating Cumulative Abnormal Returns
We use standard event study methodology to analyze the effect of Delaware
litigation on equity prices. This approach assumes that stock returns follow a
market model,
rt = ↵ +  r
m
t + "t (1)
where rt is the return on a particular stock at time t, rmt is the compounded
return on a market portfolio, and ✏t is a stochastic error. If an event, such as
a lawsuit filing or case termination, occurs on day T, then there may be an
“abnormal return” to the particular stock on that day. This can be captured
by first calculating the predicted return during the event period, which we call
r⇤t , using the constant and coefficient calculated in equation (1). To calculate
the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i we subtract the actual cumulative
return during the event window from the predicted return during the event
window: CARi = rt  r⇤t . We use event periods of varying lengths, as detailed
below, and a 255-day pre-event window consisting of T   300 to T   46.
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We want to obtain a representative estimate of the abnormal returns from
lawsuit filings for multiple stocks, under the assumption that these represent
independent events and that they share the same underlying “true” mean. We
use a weighted mean to estimate the “average abnormal return,” where the
weight for each observation is the inverse of the variance of the predictive
residual used in the calculation of the abnormal return.
We also conduct a number of analyses relating the abnormal return to the
characteristics of the lawsuit being filed. To do so we conduct weighted least
squares (WLS) regressions with the cumulative abnormal return in the event
window as the dependent variable and firm and lawsuit characteristics and the
independent variables. The WLS approach helps to correct for hetereoskedas-
ticity. (Shahrur, 2005; Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 2007) For weights we use
the inverse of the variance of the predictive residual.
4.2 Case-Type Regressions
This subsection discusses the stock price reaction to the three major types of
case type in the sample: derivative lawsuits, acquisition-related lawsuits, and
contract disputes. We analyze both the filing and the termination of cases. We
define the date the plaintiff filed the complaint as the date of filing indicated
on the docket. For terminations, we record the date of termination as the
date of the terminating event (as explained in Section 3). Table 3 reports
the regression results and in every case, except for the noted column, the
regressions do not include controls (i.e. the abnormal return is the constant,
as is standard in litigation event studies), where observations are weighted by
the inverse of the variance associated with estimate of the cumulative abnormal
return. Each coefficient is the constant term from a separate regression.
4.2.1 Derivative Lawsuits
We begin our analysis with derivative lawsuits. As noted in Section 2, we have
reason to believe that the earlier studies, which find no result related to these
cases, may not reflect more recent use of the derivative lawsuit. Our primary
reason for this hypothesis is the screening effect that the increased difficulty of
showing demand futility is likely to have. When a lawsuit does make it through
the screen—meaning that the plaintiffs think it is worth bringing—that may
bring new information to the market. Figure 2 provides some support for this
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hypothesis—it shows the running weighted abnormal returns for the ten days
prior to filing and the ten days after filing. There is a substantial drop just
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Table 3 provides further evidence that the cumulative abnormal returns
of derivative cases are negative. The [-1,0], [0,+1], and [-1,+1] windows have
negative CARs that are significant at the ten-percent level and the [-2, +2]
window has a negative effect that is significant at the five-percent level. The
significant coefficients range from -.0060 to -.0157, which suggests a loss of
0.60% to 1.57% of firm value.15 Figure 2 shows that there are negative abnor-
mal returns associated with every day that spans from two days before filing
to two days after filing.
[Insert Table 3 here]
It can, of course, be difficult to disaggregate the effect of an expected
lawsuit from the other negative effects associated with the release of the news
that gives rise to the derivative suit. It could be, for instance, that the prospect
of government investigation and subsequent fines may be the reason for the
15Twenty-two of the derivative cases also involve acquisition-related claims. When we
exclude these cases in unreported regressions, we find highly similar results with respect to
the sign, size, and statistical significance of the CARs.
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decline in stock price. Nevertheless, the negative effects in the event windows
closer to the filing date provide some evidence that the filing of the derivative
lawsuit itself has a negative impact on firm value.
There are at least two potential interpretations of the evidence of a negative
effect associated with derivative lawsuits. One is that the filing of derivative
lawsuits provides a negative signal about the quality of management and/or
board oversight and the market is punishing the firm accordingly. If, indeed,
a firm faces the prospect of losing value, this effect may inhibit the type of
wrongdoing that derivative lawsuits target. Alternatively, the loss may just be
a transfer of wealth from the firm to plaintiffs’ attorneys through attorneys’
fees.16 The difference between these two interpretations depends on the under-
lying merits of the lawsuit and the dynamic effects associated with derivative
actions. As we discuss in the section below on indicators of case quality, it
does appear that higher quality cases increase the negative effect associated
with derivative lawsuits.
4.2.2 Acquisition-Related Cases
Acquisition-related lawsuits have been the subject of extensive recent research.
Researchers have examined how multijurisdictional dynamics may affect litiga-
tion (Cain and Davidoff, 2013), whether there has been an increase in the num-
ber of challenges as opposed to the percentage of mergers challenged (Thomas
and Thompson, 2012), and how the presence of institutional parties affects fea-
tures of these cases Webber (2013). But the effect of this litigation on equity
prices has not yet been subject to analysis.
Conducting merger litigation event studies poses some difficulty because
plaintiffs often file cases right after the announcement of a merger (Fletcher
et al., 2012). We address these concerns in two ways. First, we conduct an
analysis of cases filed five or more trading days after the announcement of the
merger. At that time, the abnormal return associated with the price paid by
the acquirer should be fully incorporated into the stock price in a way that does
16Insurance policies may cover attorneys’ fees in these cases, which might mute the effect
of an award on firm value. (see, e.g., XL Spec. Ins. Co. v. Loral Space & Comm., Inc.,
011 WL 537161 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 17, 2011) (holding that a directors and officers’
insurance policy covered the attorneys’ fees in a derivative action)). That said, insurers
usually adjust rates to reflect experience. Significant derivative liability may lead to a large
increase in premiums and that change may have an adverse effect on firm value. The market
may anticipate this increase in premiums upon filing of the lawsuit and that effect could
produce negative abnormal returns.
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not overlap with the event windows. For these cases, results are insignificant
in all event windows except for the [-1,0] CAR and that result is significant
only at the ten-percent level. This evidence provides some support for our
hypothesis that the average merger lawsuit is uninformative to the market.
Figure 3 further supports this finding—the cumulative weighted AR is quite
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There are several potential objections to this first approach. One is that
the cases filed quickly are different from those filed less than five trading days
after announcement of the deal. For example, higher quality cases may get
filed more quickly than lower quality cases. Another potential problem is that
the additional time may allow the market to incorporate both the expected
lawsuit and the expected effect of the lawsuit into stock price.
To address these concerns our second type of analysis includes acquisition
cases filed at any time after announcement. We include controls for deal
timing and the premium paid. Specifically, we use indicator variables for
cases filed the same day as the announcement (sameday) or the day after
the announcement (nextday), the merger premium, and interactions between
sameday and the premium and nextday and the premium. These controls
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should account for the premium’s effect on stock price, albeit at the cost of
restricting our sample size because we do not have this information for all
cases.
The regressions with the merger controls indicate that there is no signif-
icant abnormal return associated with case filing. The sole exception is the
[-2,+2] window, which is straightforward to explain. Because we only use
sameday and nextday controls, this regression does not control for cases filed
two days after the announcement of the deal. Deal announcements typically
bring large increases in price, which indicates why the coefficient for that win-
dow is substantially larger than the estimated abnormal returns for the shorter
windows.
We view this evidence as largely consistent with our hypothesis. Merger
litigation is almost a foregone conclusion, especially toward the end of our
sample period. Market participants should expect this litigation to occur and
should factor the average effect of this litigation into the target’s equity price.
If the lawsuit provides some indication that there is likely to be a recovery for
shareholders, the market may reflect that fact, but that is an above average
result in these cases (Davidoff et al., 2015). We attempt to control for some of
these factors in the analysis below, but the evidence developed in the present
analysis does suggest that the average case has no effect on firm value at the
time of filing.
4.2.3 Contract Cases
Contract disputes are the final type of case that we analyze. Figure 4 shows
the abnormal return in the ten days before and after case filing. We find
some evidence that the filing of these cases negatively affects firm value. The
magnitude of the abnormal loss appears to be relatively modest. We find
negative effects in the [-2, 0] and [-1,0] windows that are significant at the five-
percent level. The potential for experiencing this loss in firm value may have
the effect of encouraging compliance with contracts. The results also suggest
that the occurrence of these lawsuits is not completely expected by the market.
This possibility supports our prediction that contract (and derivative) lawsuits































−10 −5 0 5 10
Trading Day (0 = Filing)
Cumulative Abnormal Return at Contract Case Filing
4.2.4 Case Terminations
Table 3 also includes information on the termination of cases. We expect
terminations to have little systematic effect on firm value. Information should
be coming to the market about the case as it proceeds, and equity prices
should reflect continual updating of the expected resolution.17 Our evidence is
consistent with that expectation.18 None of our case types is associated with
17Haslem (2005) shows a negative effect associated with settlement as opposed to judicial
resolution of a case. He attributes this effect to a signal that management would rather keep
the underlying facts confidential rather than subject them to further litigation. To try and
discern whether this effect holds for Delaware litigation, we run specifications based on the
type of termination. In these unreported regressions, we find that only settlement hearings
result in a negative effect. This result is consistent with Haslem’s findings.
18We do not include the weights in our merger termination regressions because we believe
that they distort the data. The weights reflect the volatility in stock price during the pre-
event period. For cases where the merger termination announcement occurred during or
before the pre-event period there is likely to be little volatility in the stock price because the
target firm will be trading at a slight discount to the merger price. This lack of volatility
will increase the weights for cases that take more time to resolve. Cases that resolve quickly,
however, will have smaller relative weights because the pre-event window includes the pre-
announcement volatility. The large relative weights is the likely reason why using the weights
for merger termination cases produces results that are extremely sensitive to the inclusion of
single outliers (i.e. when we remove the observations with the largest weights, the coefficients
are no longer statistically significant). None of our other results show this type of sensitivity
to outliers.
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a statistically significant abnormal return.
4.3 Case Covariates
This subsection examines the inclusion of case covariates in the estimates of
abnormal returns. As discussed in Section 2, these covariates include indica-
tions of case quality and the potential presence of cases in other jurisdictions.
Tables 4 and 5 present these results.
4.3.1 Indications of Case Quality
The first regression in Table 4 reports the results for derivative filings. Both
measures of case quality—the presence of a pro hac vice motion and the number
of cases filed—are negative, large, and statistically significant. The coefficients
are also economically significant. The average market capitalization of firms
that are the targets of derivative suits in the sample is approximately $2.19
billion at the time of filing. The 1.92 percent drop in firm value implied
by the pro hac vice coefficient implies a loss of value of approximately $420
million. This estimate is far larger than the average attorneys’ fees in Delaware
derivative cases (Webber, 2013). The coefficient for the number of cases filed
is also sizable at roughly -1.2 percent per case.
[Insert Table 4 here]
This evidence suggests that, at least in those cases with indicia of higher
quality, the decline in firm value goes beyond what the company can expect
to pay in attorneys’ fees. To put it another way, the data suggest that the
filing of a Delaware lawsuit provides a negative signal about the firm that
the market punishes. To the degree that managers respond to these types of
declines in equity prices, one could read this finding as corroborative evidence
that derivative lawsuits do have the power to deter managerial wrongdoing.
We do not find associations between our case quality variables and the fil-
ing of merger cases. The pro hac vice and the number of cases variables have
insignificant coefficients when we control for premium and timing and when
we restrict cases to those filed five or more trading days after the announce-
ment of the deal. One might explain the apparent difference that case and
attorney quality have as an indication that derivative cases are, on average,
more difficult to understand and litigate than merger lawsuits. Accordingly,
the known or expected early involvement of high quality counsel in derivative
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cases may give the market a signal that there is something to the case. In
contrast, if merger cases are relatively straightforward to litigate, the known
or expected involvement of high quality counsel may not have as much of a
consequence for the possibility of increasing the amount of consideration paid
by the target.
We do find a positive abnormal expected return associated with the ter-
mination of merger cases that involve pro hac vice motions.19 This result is
surprising insofar as market participants should be aware of the quality of
counsel representing the parties and should incorporate those assessments into
the stock price. At the same time, a number of studies show abnormal positive
returns to merger arbitrage (Jindra and Walkling, 2004; Baker and Savaşoglu,
2002; Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001). Some of these studies suggest that the re-
turns from this arbitrage come from the substantial risk associated with failed
deals. This pro hac vice result supports this account insofar as higher quality
lawyers imply that the underlying cases are more complex.20 These harder
cases may increase the risk that the deal will fail either through court action
or because the underlying deal is complicated. If market participants are not
willing to fully bear that risk—as the research on merger arbitrage suggests—
that would explain the positive abnormal return when the case terminates.
We find the expected associations with attorney and case quality in the
filing of contract cases. One would expect companies to bring in better lawyers
in cases that are more problematic and one would expect cases with better
lawyers to have a larger impact on firm value. While we cannot tease apart
these separate effects, Table 4 shows that there is a significant negative effect
associated with cases where the parties bring in out-of-state lawyers. Likewise,
where the lawsuit draws multiple cases there is a significant and negative
effect on equity prices. We note that in the representative cases, it is much
more likely that a dispute will draw multiple cases due to the competition to
become lead counsel. Contract cases rarely involve aggregate litigation and,
19This effect is robust to a variety of specifications. As we note above, we do not use
weights for the merger termination analysis. If we include these weights, the result remains
positive and statistically significant. The result is not sensitive to outliers (with respect to
weights) and it endures both with and without the use of controls for type of resolution and
judicial identity.
20This pro hac vice result could be a proxy for case length rather than for complexity
(i.e. the longer the case stretches on, more likely it is to involve a lawyer from another juris-
diction). To test for this effect we include a variable for time to termination in unreported
regressions. The pro hac vice coefficient remains positive and statistically significant and
the time to termination variable is not statistically significant.
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consequently, it is relatively rare for parties to file multiple, related cases.
Nevertheless, when a contractual dispute spurs the filing of more than one
complaint the data suggest that it will have a quite large effect on firm value.
4.3.2 Indications of Multijurisdictional Litigation
Turning to motions to expedite, we find a large, positive stock price effect
(1.92%) that is significant at the five-percent level upon the filing of a derivative
case that involves an eventual motion to expedite. Note that the magnitude of
this effect is potentially large enough to wipe out the decline in stock price–and
thus the deterrent effect–associated with higher quality cases. We view this
result as a potential indication that competition among plaintiffs undermines
incentives to pursue derivative cases with vigor. If an eventual motion to
expedite signals that a case is proceeding in another forum, the large positive
effect on stock price may reflect that the potential for a reverse auction will
dilute the effect of the derivative lawsuit. We note, however, that our the
confirmation exercise that we carry out in Appendix B does not show as strong
an association between motions to expedite and multijurisdictional litigation
in derivative lawsuits as we observe in merger litigation. For that reason, we
interpret this result with more caution than we do our more robust results.
Analyzing the role of motions to expedite in merger cases turns out to
be somewhat complex due to the shift in the amount of multijurisdictional
litigation over the course of the sample. As Cain and Davidoff document,
the number of merger challenges that involved cases filed in different states
increased from 8.5% in 2005 to 25.8% in 2006. By 2011, 47.4% of merger chal-
lenges involved claims in multiple states. Badawi (2013) shows that motions to
expedite in these sorts of cases have increased in Delaware over the same time
period. These changes mean that the reasons for filing a motion to expedite in
a merger case may have changed. Early in the sample–when it was less likely
that litigants were competing with related cases in other jurisdictions–the mo-
tivation for a motion to expedite may have been to increase leverage over the
defendant directors. In cases where these motions are likely to be success-
ful, this leverage should allow plaintiffs to secure a larger increase in merger
consideration. But later in the sample, filing a motion to expedite may be a
response to a group of attorneys litigating in other states. When a motion to
expedite is expected in these cases, one may expect a negative effect on stock
price because the potential for a reverse auction substantially decreases the
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leverage that plaintiffs’ attorneys have over the defendant directors.
To account for this potential change in the effect of a motion to expedite we
interact the expedite variable with the year fixed effects. The results suggest
that the meaning of an expected motion to expedite has shifted over the span of
the sample. Table 5 reports these results in three separate windows for merger
filings with the SDC controls and merger cases filed 5 or more trading days
after the deal announcement. In three out of the six regressions the baseline
effect of a motion to expedite is positive, large, and significant at either the five
or one-percent level. This implies that during 2004, which is the omitted year
for the interactions, the expectation of a motion to expedite signaled that the
attorneys might gain leverage over the board. But the effects of the interaction
show that this effect began to disappear. For many of the years after 2004, the
effect of the interaction is large, negative, and statistically significant.21 To the
degree that the expectation of a motion to expedite later in the sample signals
that there is litigation going on in another forum, these results provide some
evidence that this sort of competition has a negative effect for shareholders
that is consistent with the reverse auction concern.22
[Insert Table 5 here]
4.4 Wealth Effects and Judicial Assignment
The docket includes information on the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor assigned
to the case. We use this information to assess the wealth effect of a particular
judge being assigned to a case at the time the judge is revealed and at the
time the case is decided.23
21To check the robustness of these findings, we run similar, unreported regressions for the
derivative cases. We expect that the interaction variables will not be significant because
there is no evidence that the meaning of a motion to expedite has shifted in the same way
that it has for the acquisition-related cases. The results largely confirm this expectation
insofar as only two of the year-expedite interaction variables are significant (one at the
ten-percent level and another at the five-percent level).
22Note that the coefficients on the interaction terms are roughly in the same range. We
do not place much weight on the difference between each of the coefficients because those
differences are not that large. Rather our emphasis is on the difference between 2004, when
there was little multijurisdictional litigation, and the following years when that litigation
increased substantially.
23Some cases get assigned to Case Masters, which are roughly the equivalent of mag-
istrates. We keep these cases in the dataset for all of the analysis above, but we limit
the analysis in this section to cases assigned to the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellors. Vice
Chancellor Glasscock was the only new judge that came into the sample during the analysis
period. He was confirmed in 2011, near the end of the sample. Because he appears in so
few cases, we omit him from the analysis.
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Tables 6 and 7 show the results for these regressions. Columns 1 and 2 in-
clude all acquisition-related cases, Columns 3 and 4 include all non-acquisition-
related contracts cases, and Columns 5 and 6 include all non-acquisition-
related derivative cases. We focus on the [+1, +4] event window for case
filing because the assignment of a judge to a case usually does not occur until
several business days after filing. We run the regressions both with controls for
party status, market capitalization, plaintiff status, pension fund involvement,
total cases, motions to expedite, pro hac vice, and industry and without those
controls. The merger regression includes the premium and timing controls
used in the earlier analysis.
[Insert Table 6 here]
As Table 6 shows, we find no significant effects associated with the identity
of the judge near filing.24 This is the case both when we omit case controls
and when we include them. There are two ways to interpret these results. The
first is that the market places little or no weight on the identity of the judge
deciding the case. This could be because judges have little impact on how
litigants resolve case, because they decide in a similar manner, or because any
differences are not valued by the market. A second possibility is that there are
substantive differences between judges, but we are unable to discern them with
our data. One methodological difficulty is the variation in the time of judicial
assignment. The docket does not provide information about the date that
the judge assigned to the case became public. Conversations with Delaware
lawyers suggests that the average time between filing and assignment is roughly
two to three days, but we cannot verify that claim. As a consequence, we must
use a relatively long window (four days) and that makes the analysis more
imprecise.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Table 7 reports the results for case terminations. While the filing regres-
sions attempt to measure the reaction to judicial assignment, the market, of
course, knows the judge at the time of termination (barring an extremely quick
stipulated dismissal). We view these regressions as a measure of the degree
to which the termination of the case differs from market expectations. The
results show little direct effect associated with the judge variables.
24As noted above, we omit the cases assigned to Case Masters and to Vice Chancellor
Glasscock. This accounts for the different number of observations in this table and in those
that use the complete sample.
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As with the filing regressions, there are two potential interpretations. One
is that the market anticipates the effect of the judge on the termination of the
case and incorporates that effect into the stock price prior to termination. The
second possibility is that our data are not robust enough to pick up an effect.
This is, of course, a possibility, but we have more confidence that the lack of
significant effects are meaningful relative to the judicial filing regressions. We
use a narrow two-day window for these results so we do not have as many
problems with imprecision. In addition, the market has much more time—in
some cases years—to develop expectations about what is likely to happen in
these cases. The notion that market participants will be able to impound the
judge’s likely effect on the resolution of the case at the time of that resolution
does not strike us as far-fetched.
5 Conclusion
This study provides evidence that answers three open questions about corpo-
rate litigation. First, the event studies suggest that the filing of derivative
lawsuits have a negative effect on firm value. The magnitude of these effects
suggests that the loss of shareholder wealth exceeds the direct costs associated
with litigation. This effect suggests that market participants make a negative
inference about firms that are the subject of derivative suits.
Second, the data suggest that multijurisdictional litigation may dilute the
effect of shareholder litigation. Insofar as motions to expedite are an indicator
that litigation is going on elsewhere, we show that these procedural moves mit-
igate the negative effect of derivative litigation and may diminish prospects of
a shareholder recovery in acquisition-related litigation. We view this evidence
as providing some confirmation of the reverse auction hypothesis. If firms have
a competing group of plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions, they may be able to
settle for less than they would if they were dealing with plaintiffs in a single
jurisdiction.25
Third, we find little evidence that judicial identity affects firm values either
at assignment or at the time of termination. This evidence provides some
indication that any judicial effects at the time that judges are revealed are too
small to detect statistically.
25We take no position, on what the “right” amount of shareholder litigation is. Our data
only allow us to make relative inferences about the effects of shareholder litigation.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
ln(Market Cap.) Natural logarithm of the market capitalization
as reported in Compustat at the end of the
quarter in which the complaint was filed.
Pension Fund Pension fund appears as one of the parties.
Pro Hac Vice Motion Filed The docket shows that at least one pro hac
vice motion was filed during the course of the
litigation.
Motion to Expedite Filed The docket shows that at least one motion to
expedite proceedings filed during the course of
litigation.
Total Complaints Filed The total number of complaints filed that al-
lege a similar claim based on a similar set of
facts.
Plaintiff The public company in the case is the plaintiff.
Chandler The case was initially assigned to Chancellor
Chandler.
Laster The case was initially assigned to Vice Chan-
cellor Laster.
Noble The case was initially assigned to Vice Chan-
cellor Noble.
Strine The case was initially assigned to then-Vice
Chancellor Strine.




Motions to Expedite and Multijurisdictional Litigation
As discussed in Section 2.3, conversations with Delaware lawyers and some
empirical evidence suggests that competing litigation in other jurisdictions
may motivate a motion to expedite. We investigate that relationship in this
appendix by ascertaining whether cases that involved a motion to expedite
were, in fact, being litigated on multiple fronts. To do so, we examine the sued
or suing firm’s 10-Q, 10-K, and related securities filings for the period after the
filing of the Delaware case. We obtain these filings from the SEC’s EDGAR
database. Firms are required to disclose “material” information, including
lawsuits, and most 10-Q and 10-K filings have a subsection labeled “Litigation,”
or something similar. We proceed on the assumption that if the company
discloses the Delaware case, it will disclose related litigation elsewhere. But
if the company does not disclose the Delaware case, it will not disclose other
similar cases in other jurisdictions. The company may not disclose these cases
because it deems them not “material.”
We randomly select a subsample of the merger and derivative cases and
read the related securities filings. For the merger cases, we limit the subsample
to cases where the shareholders sue the directors of the target in an active deal
because there is almost always an attorney’s fee to be had in these cases (Cain
& Davidoff, 2012). Cases involving failed mergers and those suing bidders have
far worse prospects and are unlikely to produce the fee that drives multijuris-
dictional competition. Of the 76 merger cases we examined, we were unable
to find a disclosure of the Delaware case for 21 of them. For the remaining 55
cases, the Pearson correlation coefficient for the presence of multijurisdictional
litigation and a motion to expedite is .558. More concretely, of the 38 cases
that involve a motion to expedite, 31 of them have a similar case proceeding
in another jurisdictions. Of the 17 cases without a motion to expedite, only 4
involve litigation in another jurisdiction.
For derivative cases, we examine 26 cases and are able to locate disclosures
of the Delaware case in 17 of them. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the
presence of multijurisdictional litigation and the filing of a motion to expedite
in the Delaware case is .311. Of the 9 cases without a motion to expedite,
only 1 of those cases involves multijurisdictional litigation. Of the remaining
8 cases, 3 of them involve multijurisdictional litigation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Case Filings and Case Terminations
Filings Terminations














Merger (SDC matched) 0.256 0.116
Contract 0.270 0.286
ln(Market Cap) 7.483 2.266 7.801 2.310
Pension Fund 0.144 0.141
Total Complaints Filed 1.427 1.166 1.362 1.011
Motion to Expedite Filed 0.411 0.347
Pro Hac Vice Motion Filed 0.675 0.626
Industry
Consumer Non-Durables 0.0485 0.0483
Consumer Durables 0.0165 0.0190
Manufacturing 0.0778 0.0741
Oil, Gas, Coal 0.0513 0.0534
Business Equipment 0.214 0.207






Table 2: Case Resolutions by Year of Filing
Year Stip. Dismissal Settlement Hearing Consolidated Court Dismissal Mean Days to Resolution
2004 50 15 28 19 355.5
2005 44 14 65 21 256.9
2006 46 9 17 15 325.8
2007 44 11 31 10 251.0
2008 43 10 10 5 315.4
2009 50 20 28 9 246.7
2010 54 12 75 2 145.6































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Cumulative Abnormal Return and Case Characteristics in the [0,+1] Window
Case Filings Case Terminations
Derivative Merger (SDC) Merger (5+ days) Contract Derivative Merger Contract
ln(Market Cap) -0.00156 0.00358 0.000293 -0.00102 -0.000639 0.000181 0.00286
(0.00201) (0.00210)⇤ (0.000767) (0.00115) (0.00163) (0.00131) (0.00123)⇤⇤
Pension Fund 0.0131 0.00625 0.00268 -0.0103 -0.00113 0.00486 0.00189
(0.0102) (0.00758) (0.00396) (0.0187) (0.00776) (0.00717) (0.0295)
Pro Hac Vice Motion Filed -0.0192 0.00936 -0.000727 -0.0120 0.00438 0.0196 -0.00497
(0.00949)⇤⇤ (0.00756) (0.00402) (0.00532)⇤⇤ (0.00653) (0.00753)⇤⇤⇤ (0.00493)
Motion to Expedite Filed 0.0192 -0.00518 0.00343 0.00910 -0.00306 -0.00512 0.00297
(0.00957)⇤⇤ (0.00640) (0.00336) (0.00587) (0.00735) (0.00657) (0.00576)
Total Complaints Filed -0.0122 -0.00162 0.000769 -0.0283 0.00395 0.00277 0.00493
(0.00496)⇤⇤ (0.00196) (0.00140) (0.00558)⇤⇤⇤ (0.00331) (0.00342) (0.00613)
Plainti  -0.160 0.0130 0.00186 0.0342 -0.00283
(0.0717)⇤⇤ (0.00841) (0.00535) (0.0126)⇤⇤⇤ (0.00536)
Constant -0.0166 -0.0300 -0.00660 0.0730 -0.00657 0.0115 -0.0508
(0.0386) (0.0324) (0.0126) (0.0351)⇤⇤ (0.0262) (0.0298) (0.0302)⇤
Observations 144 282 435 279 98 198 163
R2 0.225 0.645 0.084 0.202 0.210 0.165 0.386
Year Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents results from WLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return in the indicated window as the dependent vari-
able. Day zero is the day the  rst complaint is  led against the target  rm. The  rst merger  ling regression includes controls for the merger
premium, indicator variables for whether the plainti s  led the lawsuit on the same day as the announcement of the transaction (sameday),
the day after the transaction (nextday), and interaction variables for premium*sameday, and premium*nextday. The second merger  ling re-
gression includes all cases  led  ve or more trading days after the announcement of the merger. Each observation is weighted by the inverse
of the variance associated with estimate of the cumulative abnormal return. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote signi cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% con dence levels, respectively.
Table 5: Abnormal Return to Merger Case Filing and with Expedite Interactions
CAR 0,+2 CAR -1,0 CAR 0, +1
SDC Controls Five+ Days SDC Controls Five+ Days SDC Controls Five+ Days
Plainti  -0.171 0.00315 -0.110 0.00316 -0.165 0.0131
(0.0716)⇤⇤ (0.00951) (0.119) (0.00821) (0.0709)⇤⇤ (0.00848)
Pension Fund 0.00311 0.00265 -0.00252 0.00314 0.00165 0.00256
(0.00774) (0.00463) (0.0129) (0.00399) (0.00769) (0.00413)
ln(Market Cap) 0.00334 0.000452 0.00117 0.0000800 0.00413 0.000302
(0.00214) (0.000891) (0.00355) (0.000767) (0.00213)⇤ (0.000794)
Pro Hac Vice Motion Filed 0.0138 -0.000594 0.0152 -0.00454 0.0167 -0.000710
(0.00787)⇤ (0.00457) (0.0131) (0.00394) (0.00782)⇤⇤ (0.00407)
Motion to Expedite Filed 0.0546 0.00851 -0.00643 0.0666 0.0489 0.0125
(0.0206)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0154) (0.0342) (0.0133)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0204)⇤⇤ (0.0138)
Total Complaints Filed -0.00113 0.00156 0.00278 -0.00113 -0.000506 0.000820
(0.00206) (0.00159) (0.00342) (0.00137) (0.00205) (0.00142)
2005 * Expedite -0.0853 -0.0228 0.00989 -0.0667 -0.0783 -0.0176
(0.0288)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0182) (0.0477) (0.0157)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0285)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0163)
2006 * Expedite -0.0939 -0.0220 0.0283 -0.0745 -0.0994 -0.0254
(0.0286)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0223) (0.0475) (0.0192)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0284)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0199)
2007 * Expedite -0.0578 -0.00365 0.0164 -0.0597 -0.0597 -0.00950
(0.0256)⇤⇤ (0.0186) (0.0425) (0.0160)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0254)⇤⇤ (0.0166)
2008 * Expedite -0.0432 0.0164 -0.00905 -0.0501 -0.0428 0.00433
(0.0338) (0.0206) (0.0561) (0.0177)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0336) (0.0184)
2009 * Expedite -0.0538 0.00442 0.0173 -0.0594 -0.0482 -0.00173
(0.0370) (0.0237) (0.0614) (0.0204)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0367) (0.0211)
2010 * Expedite -0.0589 -0.00756 -0.00495 -0.0629 -0.0514 -0.0110
(0.0241)⇤⇤ (0.0168) (0.0400) (0.0145)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0239)⇤⇤ (0.0150)
2011 * Expedite -0.0671 -0.00148 0.000848 -0.0702 -0.0591 -0.00684
(0.0246)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0169) (0.0409) (0.0145)⇤⇤⇤ (0.0244)⇤⇤ (0.0150)
Observations 282 435 282 435 282 435
R2 0.659 0.092 0.705 0.156 0.664 0.094
Year Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents results from WLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return in the indicated window as the
dependent variable. Day zero is the day the  rst complaint is  led against the target  rm. The  rst regression in each win-
dow includes controls for the merger premium, indicator variables for whether the plainti s  led the lawsuit on the same day
as the announcement of the transaction (sameday), the day after the transaction (nextday), and interaction variables for pre-
mium*sameday, and premium*nextday. The second regression in each window includes all cases  led  ve or more trading days
after the announcement of the merger. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with estimate of
the cumulative abnormal return. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signi cance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% con dence levels, respectively.
Table 6: Abnormal Returns to Filing in the [+1,+4] Window
with Judicial Controls (relative to Parsons)
Derivative Merger Contract
Chandler -0.000123 0.0382 0.00480 -0.000880 0.00860 0.0142
(0.0229) (0.0300) (0.00631) (0.00721) (0.00855) (0.00914)
Laster 0.0112 0.0349 -0.00244 -0.00569 -0.00530 -0.00813
(0.0329) (0.0428) (0.00819) (0.00860) (0.0133) (0.0151)
Noble 0.00246 0.0135 0.00718 0.00611 -0.00116 -0.000216
(0.0297) (0.0338) (0.00706) (0.00738) (0.00923) (0.00978)
Strine 0.0128 0.0488 0.00749 0.00191 -0.00471 -0.00382
(0.0243) (0.0294) (0.00583) (0.00665) (0.00817) (0.00933)
Lamb 0.00493 0.0374 0.00454 0.00556 -0.00119 0.00784
(0.0258) (0.0337) (0.00646) (0.00813) (0.00950) (0.0108)
Observations 142 142 277 277 250 250
R2 0.006 0.109 0.011 0.112 0.014 0.147
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
This table presents results from WLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal re-
turn in the indicated window as the dependent variable. Day zero is the day the  rst com-
plaint is  led against the target  rm. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
controls include the same as those in Table 4 (whether the party is a plainti , the pres-
ence of pension funds, whether a pro had vice motion or motion to expedite was  led in
the case, and the total number of complaints. The merger regression control add controls
for the merger premium, indicator variables for whether the plainti s  led the lawsuit on
the same day as the announcement of the transaction (sameday), the day after the trans-
action (nextday), and interaction variables for premium*sameday, and premium*nextday.
Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with estimate of the
cumulative abnormal return. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote signi cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% con dence levels, respectively.
Table 7: Abnormal Returns to Termination in the [0,+1] Window with
Judicial Controls (relative to Parsons)
Derivative Merger Contract
Chandler -0.0142 -0.0146 0.00584 0.00598 -0.00747 -0.00778
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.00933) (0.00956) (0.00874) (0.00885)
Laster -0.0165 -0.0157 0.00908 0.00885 0.00729 0.00857
(0.0137) (0.0142) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.00914) (0.00947)
Noble -0.0256 -0.0225 -0.00605 -0.00700 0.00378 0.00520
(0.0181) (0.0186) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.00856) (0.00906)
Strine -0.00390 -0.00416 0.00378 0.00400 0.00737 0.00793
(0.0137) (0.0143) (0.00926) (0.00948) (0.00784) (0.00805)
Lamb -0.0116 -0.0124 0.00619 0.00634 0.0142 0.0141
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0101) (0.0102)
Observations 91 91 194 194 136 136
R2 0.231 0.278 0.183 0.187 0.554 0.560
Case Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resolution Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
This table presents results from WLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return in
the indicated window as the dependent variable. Day zero is the day the  rst complaint is  led
against the target  rm. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. The case controls in-
clude the same as those in Table 4 (whether the party is a plainti , the presence of pension funds,
whether a pro had vice motion or motion to expedite was  led in the case, and the total number
of complaints. The resolution controls provide indicator variables for whether the case ended
through a consolidation, settlement hearing, or a judicial dismissal (stipulated dismissals are the
omitted category). Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with
estimate of the cumulative abnormal return. The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote signi cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% con dence levels, respectively.
